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ON COLLABORATIVE REFERENCE 
AND THE ROLES OF THE INTERLOCUTOR 
____________________________________________________
 Eduarda Calado Barbosa1
RESUMO
Neste trabalho, eu exploro a ideia de que a colaboração é requerida para a
completude  de  atos  de referir-se  ao asserir  conteúdo proposicional.  Essa
afirmação é sustentada por um marco empírico proposto primeiramente por
HH Clark e seus coautores em fins dos anos 80, mas que está correntemente
sendo desenvolvido por pesquisadores nas áreas de sociologia, linguística e
psicologia. Eu pretendo mostrar que, no que concerne às investigações filo-
sóficas centradas na referência do falante, nós temos boas razões para supor
que atos de referir são também direcionados ao ouvinte, como é sugerido
por um trabalho recente de Kent Bach. Consequentemente, nós precisamos
de uma teoria não-idealizada de asserções compatível com a observação em-
pírica de como conversas diádicas reais funcionam. Para isso, eu enfoco em
uma crítica à teoria da asserção de Stalnaker e ofereço formas de superar as
dificuldades por ela trazidas, defendendo uma visão colaborativa da perfor-
mance de asserções e dos atos de referência do falante.
Palavras-chave:  Referência  do  falante.  Asserção.  Conversação.  Colabora-
ção. 
ABSTRACT
In this work, I explore the idea that collaboration is required for the comple-
tion of acts of referring by asserting propositional content. This claim is sup-
ported by an empirical framework first proponed by HH Clark and his co-
authors in the late 1980s, but currently under development by researchers in
areas such as sociology, linguistics and psychology. I intend to show that, in
what  concerns  philosophical  investigations  focused on speaker  reference,
we have reason to suppose that speaker reference is also audience-directed,
as suggested by Kent Bach in a recent work. Consequently, we need a non-
idealized theory of assertions compatible with the empirical observations of
how dyadic spontaneous conversations work. For that, I focus on a critique
of Stalnaker’s theory of assertion and offer ways to overcome the difficulti-
es it brings up, defending a collaborative view of assertion-making and acts
of referring.
Keywords: Speaker Reference; Assertion; Conversation; Collaboration.
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One of P.F. Strawson’s most significant contributions to the study of
reference is his emphasis on speaker reference. In a nutshell, he developed
the idea that even though acts of referring depend first on the mastering of
conventional rules of usage, they also depend on speakers recognizing cir-
cumstances of use. Strawson’s view – put forward in his famous On refer-
ring (1950) – was later renewed by Bach (2008), who added to it the idea
that usage is not only speaker-oriented but also audience-directed. 
Bach classifies  speaker reference as a four-place relation in which
speakers choose  expressions whose  uses  enable  their  audience to  think
about individuals. This view opposes the more traditional treatments of ref-
erence as either a binary relation between words (in what concerns seman-
tics,  their  conventional  meaning or logical form) and individuals or as a
three-place relation between a word, a speaker who uses it and the individ-
ual it refers to. The view that reference is a binary relation can be found in
Russell (1905), and the view that referring is a three-place relation, can be
seen in Strawson himself. About his own position Bach affirms: 
[…] a speaker, in choosing an expression to use to refer the hearer to
the individual he has in mind, is in fact answering the following ques-
tion: given the circumstances of utterance, the history and direction of
the conversation, and the mutual knowledge between me and my audi-
ence, how informative an expression do I need to use to enable them
to identify the individual I have in mind? Note that informativeness
here can depend not only on the semantic information encoded by the
expression, but on the information carried by the fact that  it is being
used. (BACH, 2008, p. 21).
Bach approaches reference in terms of acts of referring. Hence, in his view,
reference is not described in general abstract terms, but with attention to
what agents do when they intend to refer in conversations. I believe this is a
more  empirically  adequate  standpoint  since  most  acts  of  referring  are
interactive and involve conversational exchange. An idealized and generalist
approach to reference has many explanatory merits, but, here, I will adopt a
criterion of empirical adequacy and commit to the prima facie assumption
that empirical adequacy is advantageous in accounting for the workings of
ordinary language and its usage.
My purpose will be to explore the common denominator between
Bach’s Strawson-inspired view and the idea that reference is collaborative,
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which is in consonance with sociological and developmental studies in lan-
guage use, as remarked by Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986). I will begin with
an overview of speaker reference. In section 2, I present the idealized view
of assertion and how it impacts theories of reference. I will finish, in section
3, by pointing out how the problems raised by the idealized view can be
solved by theories that privilege a collaborative view of reference that em-
phasizes the role of interlocutors.
A brief comment on the relevance of the Strawsonian notion of speaker 
reference 
It is true that criticism of the notion of singular reference (reference
to individuals) as a property of expressions has been a well-established posi-
tion in the philosophy of language at least since the 1950s and 60s. This cri-
ticism  was  settled  on  the  assumption  that  reference  and  truth-value,  as
semantic properties, are sensitive to pragmatic aspects and, therefore, should
not be understood as properties of words. Strawson (1950;1954; 1964) was
one of the predecessors of this idea. 
It can be said that Strawson contributed to the discussions about ref-
erence with the acknowledgement that what is encoded in the conventional
meaning of a singular term – or uniquely referring expression, in his termi-
nology2 – does not suffice to explain its reference. It is important to briefly
recall,  however,  that  Strawson is  dialoguing with Russell  (1905) and his
concurrent position about the semantics of singular terms – definite descrip-
tions and proper names, in particular.
While Russell claimed that the logical forms of sentences with sin-
gular terms hide existential propositions that, when false, render the whole
sentential  complexes false,  Strawson held that  referring is  not something
that sentences “do”; only agents refer – more precisely, by applying the me-
anings of sentences to instances of use. In response to Russell’s prediction
about the effects that nonexistent referents have on truth-value attribution,
Strawson chooses a clearly pragmatically oriented strategy. To use the now
classic  example  of  the  definite  description  ‘the  present  king  of  France’,
2  The set of expressions that includes words that refer to individuals, such as proper names,
definite descriptions, indexicals and demonstratives.
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Strawson argued that the definite description in question does not pick an in-
dividual in virtue solely of its meaning. Meaning serves to orient speakers
on how to use the expression in the appropriate circumstances in order to re-
fer. Thence, if one were to utter (1)
(1) The present king of France opened the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio.
given that, in 2016, France was a republic and thus had no king, the use of
(1) would be spurious and would elicit intuitions of truth-value gap. 
For Strawson, this result is due to the fact that the reference of the
token of the definite description in (1) depends on use and not on its seman-
tic properties as a type-expression3. The important opposition, here, is be-
tween meaning and usage.
In this special sense of “mean”, it is people who mean, not expres-
sions.  People  use  expressions  to  refer  to  particular  things.  But  the
meaning of an expression is not the set of things or the single thing it
may correctly  be used  to  refer  to:  the  meaning  is  the set  of  rules,
habits, conventions for its use in referring. (STRAWSON, 1950, p.
328)
Strawson then represents an important milestone in the recent his-
tory of philosophy of language: he helped to shift the emphasis of theories
of reference from word reference to speaker reference. Strawson was pivotal
in making it possible for theorist of reference to focus on agential aspects.
We must not forget other very important contributions, coming from Grice
(1967) and Austin (1962; 1979), with the concepts of speaker meaning and
of performative speech acts4, of course, but, here, my purpose is to highlight
only Strawson’s contribution as it paved the ground for Bach’s view.
Now, unlike Strawson, Bach includes interpersonal elements in his
theory of speaker reference. In taking a closer look at how agents refer in
the fundamental site of the use of language, conversation, he began to de-
3  See Strawson (1950) for more about the distinction between use, type-expression and oc-
currence of the type-expression. 
4  Grice defines speaker meaning as different from sentence meaning. While the former de-
pends on communicative intentions, the later depends on the syntactic-semantic profile of
linguistic expressions. Austin, on his turn, advanced the influent framework of speech act
theory. In particular, he explores the idea that speakers can do more with words than just
asserting. They can perform acts like giving orders, making promises, etc. 
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fend that acts of referring are not static and/or individualist. Rather, they are
dynamic and interpersonal. 
1. The idealized view of asserting and referring
As we saw in the previous section, Strawson was responsible for in-
troducing the notion of speaker  reference to the philosophical  discussion
about reference. Nevertheless, he did not put much effort in offering a ro-
bust theory of asserting that, like his theory of reference, also highlighted
the role of speakers in language use. We can find one such a theory in the
works  of  Stalnaker,  though.  Assertions  are  defined  by  Stalnaker  (1978;
1999; 2002) as speech acts that contribute with new information to the con-
texts in which they are performed. Contexts, on their own turn, are repre-
sented in terms of presupposed information. For Stalnaker (1999), a context
corresponds to the common ground of assumptions shared by the partici-
pants in each conversation. The success of a new assertion then depends on
how the participants react to adjusting the common ground with the new in-
formation (with accommodation or rejection5).
There is no doubt that Stalnaker’s theory represents some progress
in what regards the acknowledgement of pragmatic and interpersonal as-
pects involved in asserting. Assertion is portraited in his theory as some-
thing  a  speaker  does,  and an  interpreter  evaluates.  The interpreter  has  a
fundamentally normative role: she evaluates if an assertion does not contra-
dict previous propositional commitments that are shared by the participants
in the conversation. Her only possible moves then are to either accommoda-
te the new contribution or to reject it. 
In the Stalnakerian-framework, interpreters receive complete asser-
tions as inputs. In the case of acts of referring by means of asserting, they
determine the reference and then deliver an attitude of acceptance or rejec-
tion to the assertion as the output. Such a description of the role of inter-
preters has been criticized by authors such as Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986)
who point out that it is built on an idealization of how agents interpret asser-
tions and acts of referring, one that mimics a literary model. They affirm:
5  If participants accept the new assertion as an adequate contribution or reject  it  on the
grounds of informational discrepancies, irrationality or contradiction. 
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Traditionally, philosophers, linguists, and psychologists have pre-
supposed what might be called a literary model of definite refer-
ence.  Speakers  refer  as  if  they  were  writing  to  distant  readers.
When Elizabeth selects the noun phrase the clown with a red nose
in talking to Sam, the assumption is that she intends it to enable
him to identify the clown uniquely. She satisfies her intentions by
issuing the noun phrase. Her act of referring is cotemporal with
that noun phrase, beginning with  the and ending with  nose. Fur-
ther, she retains complete responsibility and control over the course
of this process. Sam hears the definite description as if he were
reading it and, if successful, infers the identity of the referent. But
his actions have no bearing on hers in this reference. (CLARK &
WILKES-GIBBS, 1986, p. 3).
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) claim that Stalnaker conceives of as-
sertions as idealizations because he neglects the underlying division of labor
between speaker and interlocutor in the actual production of complete asser-
tions, one that can be observed in spontaneous dyadic conversations. 
As they argue, in a real conversation, the realization of an assertion
depends on mechanisms of coordination maintenance: techniques of syn-
chronization,  turn  taking  and  back-channel  responses  (such  as,  ‘uhum’,
‘hum’)  that  signal  positive verdicts  for  continuation6.  Take the  following
transcription of a spontaneous conversation between a speaker A and an in-
terlocutor B – taken from Jefferson (1973) – as an example of the kind of
evidence used by Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs:
A. I heard you were at  the beach yesterday.  What’s her name, oh you
know, the tall redhead that lives across the street from Larry? The one
who drove him to work the day his car I/ was- 
B. Oh Gina!
A. Yeah Gina. She said she saw you at the beach yesterday.
A indicated he would go on until  B identified the referent.  Indeed,  he
stopped at B’s interruption and completed the process by confirming B’s
identification with Yeah Gina. 
(CLARK & WILKES-GIBBS, 1986, p. 8).
The fragment shows one of the mechanisms to establish understand-
ing that speakers use systematically when referring by means of asserting a
certain content.  It shows that the interlocutor has an active role and collabo-
6  Conversational participants have techniques like head nodding, utterance initiation and fi-
nalization to mark turns, repairs. Cooperative participants act in ways that manifest their
engagement in the conversation.
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rates with the speaker in accomplishing her communicative goal of refer-
ring. And there are plenty of other good examples provided by research in
various areas of language studies today7. These evidence points at problems
in Stalnaker’s view. Firstly, because the interlocutor has more than a norma-
tive role.  She has a collaborative role in the completion of the assertion.
More, they show that assertions require coordination of tasks to be produced
in the first place. Consequently, an act of referring by asserting will require
that the speaker and the interlocutor establish a mutual understanding re-
garding to whom the speaker wishes to refer. The Stalnakerian view of as-
serting  and  referring  seems  then  to  be  beneath  some  expectations  of
empirical adequacy. I will discuss this last claim in what remains of this sec-
tion. 
1.1The problem with the idealized view of asserting and referring
As we saw, according to critics of the Stalnakerian theory of asser-
tion, such as HH. Clark himself (in Clark (1985)), Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs
(1986),  but  also  Goodwin  (1981),  the  endorsement  of  Stalnaker’s  view
brings unwanted consequences for theorists of reference for at least three
corelated reasons:
i. Interchange  is  the  primary  way  in  which  language  is
acquired. Sociological and linguistic8 research has found that
every  day illocutionary  acts  are  frequently  incomplete  and
only partially understood until correction is provided. Thus, a
view of conversations as a succession of complete acts that
are understood and then either accommodated or rejected by
interlocutors mimics a literary model that does not reflect the
actual use of language. 
ii. A model that takes assertions as complete acts performed by
one agent fails to account for the role of the interlocutors in
acts of asserting.
7  See Drew (1997), Lerner (2004) and Kitzinger (2013). It is in fact lamentable that these
observations and their philosophical consequences have received little attention from main-
stream philosophical investigations on pragmatics in the past.
8  See Jefferson (1973) and Glucksberg; Krauss; Higgins (1975).
104
Perspectiva Filosófica, vol. 45, n. 2, 2018
iii. Stalnaker’s theory of assertion does not offer an empirically
adequate view of acts of referring. 
To sum up, the essential problem with the idealized view of referring
would be its neglect of the collaborative nature of asserting and referring.
But Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs do not limit their job to pointing out problems.
They also offer a defense of what they call the collaborative view of refer-
ence, as an alternative that suppresses the consequences of the above-men-
tioned  problems.  In  the  last  section  of  this  paper,  I  will  present  this
collaborative view and try to show how it helps us deal with i., ii and iii. 
2. The collaborative view comes to the rescue
The criticism directed at Stalnaker’s theory of assertion by Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs is based on the idea that Stalnaker has an idealized literary
model of speech act performance that brings unwanted consequences for
theories of speaker reference. In the previous section, I presented the three
main problems with this idealized view. Here, I will focus on each one of
them and present the theoretical resources provided by collaborative views
of asserting and referring that help overcome these difficulties.  
Let us start with the problem in ii:  a model that takes assertions as
complete acts performed by one agent fails to account for the role of the in-
terlocutors  in  acts  of  asserting.  When we talk about  interlocutors  having
many roles in asserting, we have one thing in mind: asserting is a coordi-
nated task that requires a division of labor between speaker and interlocutor.
Think about any other  coordinated task.  A simple everyday activity,  like
moving a couch from one place to another with your roommate or taking a
walk with a friend. In both cases, the pairs coordinate their actions because
they have a common goal. It requires that they attend to each other’s move-
ments, pace, trajectory etc. In a collaborative view of asserting and refer-
ring, something similar happens. Take the extract below into consideration
again:
A. I  heard you were at  the  beach yesterday.  What’s  her  name,  oh you
know, the tall redhead that lives across the street from Larry? The one
who drove him to work the day his car I/ was- 
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B. Oh Gina!
A. Yeah Gina. She said she saw you at the beach yesterday. 
A has a plan of referring to Gina and B is being collaborative. A is
trying to say that Gina saw B at the beach the day before, but A and B’s in-
formational statuses about Gina need to be first adjusted to allow for the
completion of A’s communicative intention of asserting that Gina saw B at
the beach.  This general idea of adjustment is present also in Kepa Korta and
John Perry’s  Critical Pragmatics (2010). They affirm: “We want to under-
stand complicated actions and activities as cases of rational, purposeful ac-
tion, that is, as things that are done in pursuit of goals, and are sensitive to
one’s beliefs.” (KORTA & PERRY, 2011, p.35).
The authors explore the concept of plan of referring: the joint effort
in which a speaker and an interlocutor (or more) have different but collabo-
rative and coordinated tasks to achieve the general goal of information ex-
change. According to Korta & Perry, the speaker’s plan of referring to x (an
individual) involves taking the interlocutor’s informational status into con-
sideration,  warranting  that  corrections,  revisions  etc.  are  possible.  Their
framework then seems at first sight compatible with the requirements of a
collaborative view of singular reference. It predicts the division of labor em-
pirically observed by Clark, Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs and more recent works
that follow the same framework. So, adopting a combination of Korta &
Perry and Clark and Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs’ ideas, instead of an idealized
and individualistic view of asserting and referring, might help us deal with
the problem in ii.
In what concerns i., I believe that the idea of cycles of acceptance
developed by Clark & Schaefer (1987) and Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs comes in
handy to solve potential difficulties. They define cycles of acceptance as fol-
lows: 
The basic  process,  which  might  be called the acceptance cycle,
consists of a presentation plus its verdict. Let X, y, and z stand for
noun phrases or their emendations. A presents x and then B evalua-
tes it. If the verdict is not positive, then A or B must refashion that
presentation. That person can offer: a repair x’, an expansion y, or
a replacement z. The refashioned presentation, whether x’, x + y,
or z, is evaluated, and so on. 
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Acceptance cycles apply iteratively, with one repair, expansion, or
replacement  after  another,  until  a  noun  phrase  is  mutually  ac-
cepted. With that, A and B take the process to be complete […].
(CLARK & WILKES-GIBBS, 1986, p. 24) 
Remember that the problem in ii. is that a view of conversations as a
succession of complete acts that are understood and then either accommo-
dated or rejected by interlocutors mimics a literary model that does not re-
flect  the  actual  use  of  language. I  believe  that  the  concept  of  cycles  of
acceptance offers a theoretical tool to defend that acts of asserting should
not be treated as complete inputs that deliver attitudes as outputs. Rather, it
helps explain what is shown by empirical evidence, namely, that, in conver-
sations, interlocutors have an active role in making communicative inten-
tions  comprehensive.  If  there  is  an  informational  discrepancy,  the
conversation does not stop with an attitude of rejection. The interlocutor is
not a passive judge, she will collaborate simultaneously to help overcome
such discrepancies by permitting self-corrections, hesitations etc., and coop-
erating with the speaker’s role. The interpretation of the content of an asser-
tion  is,  thus,  processual  and  results  from  the  cooperative  effort  of
exchanging information by means of interacting conversationally.
Recall that the primary motivation to prefer a collaborative view ra-
ther than an idealized view of assertion is empirical adequacy. Now, we are
in position to add another motivation: the success of collaborative views in
explaining common phenomena of everyday communication, such as sol-
ving informational discrepancies. Empirical adequacy and intuitive appeal
seem to be valuable theoretical advantages when choosing an orientation in
studying natural languages. The difficulties brought up by i. can be dealt
with, then, with the inclusion of more roles for interlocutors, as the cycles of
acceptance framework suggests. 
We will now conclude with the problem in iii., which relates to the
impacts of a literary view of assertion-making for acts of referring: it seems
that all that we have discussed so far suggests that Stalnaker’s theory of as-
sertion does not offer an empirically adequate view of acts of referring. Both
the idea of plans of referring and of cycles of acceptance can be used to
avoid this consequence.  The authors behind these concepts show that we
need to attend to the relevance of common knowledge and coordination for
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the determination of reference. If asserting is taken as collaborative, refer-
ring can also be seen as an essentially collaborative activity. 
To conclude  the  case  of  the  problem in  iii.,  notice  that  Clark  &
Wilkes-Gibbs’ view of speaker reference is compatible with Bach’s thesis
that reference is a four-place relation. In the example of the conversation
between A and B, A (the speaker) uses the definite description ‘the tall red-
head that lives across the street from Larry’, for example, to refer B (his/her
audience) to Gina (the individual). Hence, empirical evidence from trans-
criptions of real dyadic conversation come to support Bach’s claim that four
elements  are  required  for  acts  of  referring.   The  common  denominator
between his philosophical account and Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs’ is, thus, their
recognition of the role of interlocutors and the consequent rejection of an
idealized speaker-oriented view of acts of referring in favor of a collaborati-
ve and audience-directed one. 
3. Conclusion
It  can  be  said  that  we  have  come  a  long  way  from  theories  centered
exclusively in word reference to pragmatic theories of reference centered on
speakers, like Strawson’s (from section 1). In sections 2 and 3, I tried to
argue  that  using  the  general  insights  motivated  by  developmental  and
sociological studies that investigate conversation, we find a reason to reject
idealized views of acts of asserting and referring in favor of a collaborative
view, in which coordination is a key factor and interlocutors have more than
a  normative  role.  A speaker  might  be aware of  her  own communicative
intentions, but the actual production of an assertion is typically carried out
simultaneously to its interpretation, with an asymmetric but still cooperative
division  of  labor.  This  offers  a  fresh  insight  into  language  and
communication  with  direct  implications  for  philosophical  theories  of
reference.  All  the  roads  lead  to  ‘collaboration’  and  ‘coordination’  as
essential words in talking about reference.   
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